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MEKANISMA PENCEGAHAN DAN PENGESANAN DEMI KESELAMATAN  
DALAM SISTEM RFID PASIF  
 
ABSTRAK 
 
Tag pengenalan frekuensi radio (RFID) kos rendah yang mematuhi piawaian 
EPCglobal Kelas-1 Generasi-2 adalah sememangnya tidak selamat disebabkan kekangan 
pengkomputeran. Tesis ini mencadangkan penggunaan mekanisma pencegahan dan 
pengesanan untuk menyelesaikan isu-isu keselamatan dan privasi. Suatu kriptografi 
ringan protokol pengesahan bersama yang tahan terhadap penjejakan, penafian 
perkhidmatan (DoS) dan serangan ulangan adalah dicadangkan sebagai mekanisma 
pencegahan. Protokol yang dicadang direkakan dengan algoritma kriptografi ringan, 
termasuk XOR, jarak Hamming, putaran dan penjana linear kongruen (MLCG) yang 
diubahsuai. Protokol yang dicadang menggunakan 64 bit indeks dibuktikan mempunyai 
kebarangkalian penafian pengenalan  yang terendah. Disamping itu, kerawakan kunci 
sesi yang dijana daripada MLCG adalah disahkan dengan menggunakan  ujian NIST. 
Selain itu, keselamatan protokol yang dicadang adalah disahkan dengan menggunakan 
alat analisis formal, AVISPA. Ketepatan protokol yang dicadang ditunjukkan dalam 
model simulasi yang dibangunkan di Java TCP / soket IP. Seterusnya, protokol yang 
dicadang dilaksanakan dalam sistem RFID termasuk IAIK UHF Demo tag, TagSense 
Nano-UHF pembaca dan pangkalan data. GUI diwujudkan dalam bentuk aplikasi Java 
untuk memaparkan data yang dikesan. Protokol yang dicadang dilaksanakan dalam 
sistem RFID sebenar melebihi performa daripada protokol lain yang berkaitan kerana 
masa membaca dan menulis yang digunakan lebih singkat sebanyak 13.46 %. Sistem 
dibuktikan mampu menghalang penjejakan, DoS, dan serangan ulangan daripada 
xx 
 
penyerang dengan keperluan pengiraan yang sederhana berbanding dengan protokol lain 
yang berkaitan. Disamping itu, kaedah pemadanan cap jari elektronik  dicadangkan 
untuk digunakan sebagai mekanisma pengesanan untuk mengesan tag palsu. Kuasa tag 
yang diterima dan pembalikkan kuasa tag digunakan sebagai cap jari elektronik dalam 
kaedah padanan cap jari yang unik. Dua ujian statistik iaitu ujian-t dan ujian ANOVA, 
digunakan dalam kaedah padanan cap jari. Lima kaedah pemadanan cap jari 
dibentangkan dan dikategorikan berdasarkan tindak balas kuasa tag dan ujian statistik 
yang digunakan. Kaedah V yang menggunakan ujian ANOVA bertiga arah untuk 
menganalisis pembalikkan kuasa tag mempunyai keputusan yang paling tepat. Ini adalah 
kerana kaedah V yang mempunyai 3 faktor (jenis tag, frekuensi, dan kedudukan) 
mempunyai kawasan bawah lengkung (AUC) tertinggi (0.999) dan nilai kadar kesalahan 
yang sama (EER) terendah (0.01). Selain itu, kadar penerimaan palsu (FAR) dan kadar 
penyingkiran palsu (FRR) yang diperolehi adalah 0.1 % dan 1.3 % setiap satu. Oleh itu, 
gabungan mekanisma pencegahan dan pengesanan boleh meningkatkan perlindungan 
sistem RFID untuk mencegah penjejakan, DoS, dan serangan ulangan, serta mampu 
mengesan tag palsu dengan cekap. 
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PREVENTION AND DETECTION MECHANISM FOR SECURITY IN PASSIVE 
RFID SYSTEM 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Low-cost radio frequency identification (RFID) tags conforming to the 
EPCglobal Class-1 Generation-2 standard are inherently insecure due to computational 
constraints. This thesis proposed the use of both prevention and detection mechanisms to 
solve the security and privacy issues. A lightweight cryptographic mutual authentication 
protocol which is resistant to tracking, denial of service (DoS) and replay attacks is 
proposed as a prevention mechanism. The proposed protocol is designed with 
lightweight cryptographic algorithm, including XOR, Hamming distance, rotation and a 
modified linear congruential generator (MLCG). The proposed protocol using 64 bits 
index is proved having the lowest non-unequivocally identification probability. In 
addition, the randomness of the session key generated from the MLCG is verified using 
NIST test suite. Besides that, the security of the proposed protocol is validated using the 
formal analysis tool, AVISPA. The correctness of the proposed protocol is demonstrated 
in a simulation model developed in JAVA TCP/IP socket. Next, the proposed protocol is 
implemented in RFID system including IAIK UHF Demo tag, TagSense Nano-UHF 
reader and back-end database. A GUI is created in a form of JAVA application to 
display data detected from tag. The proposed protocol implemented in real RFID system 
outperforms other related protocols because of 13.46 % shorter read time and write time 
consumed. The system is proved to be able to prevent tracking, DoS, and replay attacks 
from adversaries with moderate computation requirement compared to other related 
protocols. In addition, electronic fingerprint matching method is proposed to be used as 
xxii 
 
detection mechanism to detect counterfeit tags. The received and backscatter powers of 
tag are proposed to be used as unique electronic fingerprint in the fingerprint matching 
method. Two statistical tests, namely, t-test and ANOVA test, are used in the fingerprint 
matching method. Five fingerprint matching methods are presented and are categorized 
based on the power response of tag and the statistical test used.  Method V which uses 
three way ANOVA test to analyze backscatter power of tag has the most accurate 
results. This is because Method V which has 3 factors (tag type, frequency, and 
position), has the highest area under curve (AUC) (0.999) and lowest equal error rate 
(EER) (0.01) values. Besides that, the false acceptance rate (FAR) and false rejection 
rate (FRR) obtained are 0.1 % and 1.3 %, respectively. Therefore, the combination of 
prevention and detection mechanisms can enhance the protection of the RFID system in 
preventing tracking, DoS, and replay attacks as well as able to detect counterfeit tags 
efficiently.   
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.0 Background 
Radio frequency identification (RFID) has been pervasively adopted in many 
areas, such as supply chain, library, healthcare management, and waste management. 
An RFID system offers contactless identification, automatic retrieval of data, and 
wireless data storage (Hagl and Aslanidis, 2009). RFID tags do not require line-of-
sight communications. Hence, this technology provides a significant improvement in 
identification, tracking, monitoring, and stocking of objects compared to barcode 
technology (Ngai et al., 2008). Data reading using RFID also enhances performance 
and productivity by increasing the accuracy and speed of information 
communication. A RFID system can be operated using three basic components, 
namely, tag, reader, and back-end server. A passive tag stores the object’s 
information in a microchip and data stored can be read remotely using reader (Kim et 
al., 2006). The reader communicates with the tag in a bidirectional way through the 
antenna. The tag and the reader must work at the same specified frequency and 
comply with same regulations and protocols to guarantee the compatibility of the 
communication system (Ngai et al., 2007). The back-end server uses middleware to 
filter and store all the information in the tag. A middleware platform filters input data 
and emits them to the application. 
 
Counterfeiting is prevalent throughout the world, especially in the 
pharmaceutical and information technology sectors (Staake et al., 2005). Global 
counterfeit industries generate an estimated $670 billion annually 
2 
 
(MarketsandMarkets, 2010). Therefore, manufacturers started to utilize RFID 
technology to fight counterfeiting issues (Piramuthu, 2008, Tuyls and Batina, 2006, 
King and Zhang, 2009, Li and Lim, 2009). RFID that offers contactless identification 
and automatic data management enables real-time monitoring of authentic products 
(Hagl and Aslanidis, 2009). Global RFID market is expected to grow at a compound 
annual growth rate (CAGR) of roughly 17 % to a value of approximately $9.7 billion 
in the period 2011 to 2013 (Rncos, 2010). Rapid growth in RFID market is triggered 
by emerging usage of RFID technology in various applications.  
 
Based on market lifecycle analysis of 2009, Asia Pacific has the potential to 
overtake Europe by year 2020 in level of activeness of national RFID programs 
implemented. Malaysia has a mature RFID market compared to other Asia Pacific 
countries. Based on market observation, the Malaysian RFID market in 2009 reached 
approximately $9.5 million. The RFID market is anticipated to further grow to 
roughly $33.8 million by the end of 2016 with a CAGR of 19.8 % (Sebastian, 2010). 
During the period 2011 to 2015, several core sectors in Malaysia including 
government service sector, manufacturing sector, agriculture sector, transport and 
communication sector and wholesales sector will be granted with a total amount of 
$1,105 million to develop with RFID technology. Return of investment (ROI) 
analysis for the five sectors are expected to reach $5,525.6 million (Mcmc, 2010). In 
addition, with the usage of RFID technology, total factor productivity (TFP) 
contribution is expected to have an increase of 0.55 % and for labor productivity rate 
is an increase of $0.247 per nominal gross domestic product (GDP) hour in 5 years 
duration (Sebastian, 2009). 
 
3 
 
Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC) governs 
Malaysia’s RFID frequency allocation. The frequency band for RFID in Malaysia is 
from 919 MHz to 923 MHz, with a total bandwidth of 4 MHz. RFID equipments 
manufactured in Malaysia shall be certified under the Communications and 
Multimedia (Technical Standards) regulations (Minan, 2007). In 1997, the first RFID 
technology was introduced in Malaysia in which is the Malaysian electronic toll 
payment system, also known as Touch’n Go system. The first RFID passport (E-
passport) in the world is issued by Malaysia in 1998 (Juels et al., 2005). The E-
passport contains the information of the holder’s travel history including time, date 
and place of entries and exits from the country. In 2006, the Malaysian Road 
Transport Department had implemented RFID license plates (Mah, 2008) that 
contain car owner and vehicle information to enable police officer to detect the 
location of the stolen car. In addition, the world’s smallest RFID microchip (MM 
chip) with the size of 0.4 mm x 0.4 mm is released under the Malaysia Microchip 
Project in 2007 (Might, 2007). Hence, Malaysia is in a leading position in Asia in 
terms of the growth of implementation RFID technology due to several leading edge 
applications have been implemented and new RFID microchip is delivered.   
 
EPCglobal is the industry-driven reference for RFID standardization that 
develops standards to describe all the components and architecture of RFID tags, 
readers, and information systems (Martínez-Sala, 2009). EPCglobal Class 1 
Generation 2 (Gen 2) standard is the second generation RFID air interface protocol. 
This protocol is ratified as ISO 18000-6C by International Organization for 
Standardization (Razaq et al., 2008).  RFID tags that conform to Gen 2 standard are 
known to be inexpensive and are broadly used in many identification and tracking 
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methods. Gen 2 tag memory consists of four distinct banks, including bank00 
(reserved memory), bank01 (EPC memory), bank10 (TID memory) and bank11 (user 
memory). An electronic product code (EPC) tag has two security features including 
kill command to permanently silence a tag and the access command to control the 
access of a tag memory (Bailey and Juels, 2006). A kill command with a valid 32-bit 
kill password is used to permanently deactivate a fraud tag. An access command with 
a valid 32-bit access password is used to trigger a tag into secure state. Tag’s 
information is protected as read or write process could be conducted only when the 
tag is in the secure state. EPC tags offer higher reliability, greater read range and 
enhanced security and privacy protection. Hence, the high performance of the EPC 
tags is the key contributor to the deployment of RFID technology in various 
applications. 
 
1.1 Problem Statements 
 RFID protocols that proposed by researchers can be divided into four 
categories, namely, full-fledged, simple, lightweight, and ultralightweight protocols 
(Chien, 2007). A full-fledged protocol uses complex cryptographic functions that 
require intensive computation resource (Feldhofer and Wolkerstorfer, 2007). A 
protocol is considered as simple protocol if random number generator and hash 
function are used (Wong et al., 2006). A lightweight protocol uses random number 
generator and cyclic redundancy code (CRC) function instead of hash function 
(Chien and Chen, 2007). An ultralightweight protocol requires simple mathematic 
functions, including bitwise XOR, OR, and AND (Karthikeyan and Nesterenko, 
2005, Peris-Lopez et al., 2006c, Peris-Lopez et al., 2009c). However, a Gen 2 tag 
does not support the expensive asymmetric and the hash function (Juels, 2005). A 
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complex cryptographic encryption cannot be deployed in a Gen 2 tag for security 
purpose (Sun and Ting, 2009). Hence, Gen 2 tag is capable to support lightweight 
and ultralightweight protocols only. The security levels of ultralightweight protocols 
are weaker than lightweight protocols due to the former protocols are more 
vulnerable to passive attacks (Hernandez-Castro et al., 2009, Peris-Lopez et al., 
2009a).  
 
Many studies have been conducted over the years to find the best solution in 
improving the security level of Gen 2 ultra-high frequency (UHF) passive RFID tag. 
The security protection of an EPC tag against eavesdropping, impersonation, and 
cloning threats is difficult because it has no explicit authentication and security 
functionalities (Juels, 2005). EPC tags, which are known to be inexpensive, are 
broadly used in many identification and tracking methods. However, the use of EPC 
tags is inherently insecure. The most challenging security threats in an RFID EPC 
tags are privacy threats in terms of eavesdropping and impersonation, as well as 
threats on tag cloning (Kim et al., 2006, Lehtonen et al., 2009). Hence, an RFID 
system is vulnerable to suffer from variable attacks including denial of service (DoS) 
attack, attacking and modifying tag threat, traffic analysis threat and spoofing attack 
(Yanjun, 2010). The potential invasion of privacy and security due to lack of 
encrypted message between an RFID reader and a tag has raised various concerns 
from the public (Chein and Chen, 2009). Privacy threat when a tag number combines 
with personal information becomes serious where users are exposed to location threat, 
constellation threat, transaction threat, preference threat, and breadcrumb threat (Kim 
et al., 2007). The privacy of the public must be protected by ensuring the meaning of 
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private information transmitted between the RFID reader and the tag is secure from 
attackers.  
 
EPC tags offer minimal resistance against eavesdropping, which is one of the 
most serious threats in RFID communication (Rieback et al., 2006). Communication 
between a legitimate tag and a reader is often unprotected and can be easily 
intercepted by adversaries. In addition, an EPC tag is vulnerable to impersonation 
threat because of its characteristic of releasing data information to any compatible 
reader (Berbain et al., 2009). Impersonation occurs when an entity attempts to gain 
access to resources and information by pretending and adopting the identity of an 
authorized user (Mitrokotsa et al., 2008). EPC tags are vulnerable to cloning threats 
because they do not have explicit anti-cloning features (Choi et al., 2009). These tags 
have low functionality and cannot perform cryptographic algorithm to prevent tag 
cloning. EPC tags are exposed to skimming attacks, in which tags disclose vital data 
and information to any query reader (Razaq et al., 2008). This indicates that EPC 
tags lack authentication and encryption, which can enable readers to collect 
information of the tags they scan. Hence, any adversary can gather required 
information and can manipulate the collected information to clone counterfeit tags 
(Wong et al., 2006). This information may be used to create counterfeit tags that bear 
the same information as that of a legitimate tag. Counterfeit tags can be attached to 
bogus products and disguise these as authentic products in the market (Mirowski et 
al., 2009, Lehtonen et al., 2007). The counterfeit tag issue is very serious because it 
is capable of causing a menace ranging from public privacy and safety issues to loss 
of industry revenues.  
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1.2 Research Objectives 
 The aim of this research is mainly to enhance security and privacy for low- 
cost RFID tags. The main objectives of this research can be summarized as follow: 
 
i. To investigate prevention and detection mechanisms to improve 
security in low-cost RFID communication system. 
 
ii. To design, analyze, and test a lightweight cryptographic algorithm that 
conforms to the Gen 2 standard in the aspects of secure from tracking, 
DoS, and replay attacks for prevention mechanism in real RFID 
communication system. 
 
iii. To design and evaluate a unique fingerprint matching method to detect 
counterfeit and legitimate tags efficiently based on tag power response 
for improved detection mechanism. 
 
iv. To characterize and suggest the proposed prevention and detection 
mechanisms for low-cost RFID communication system. 
 
1.3 Scope of Work 
Both prevention and detection mechanisms are deployed in order to protect 
RFID system from privacy threats in term of tracking, DoS, replay, and tag cloning 
attacks. A lightweight cryptographic mutual authentication protocol that using simple 
mathematical functions, including bitwise XOR, rotation, Hamming distance, and 
pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) function are designed to protect the data 
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secrecy. The robustness of designed protocol is analyzed and proved secured by 
using AVISPA formal analysis tool.  A back-end database and graphical user 
interface (GUI) are developed to create a complete RFID communication system. 
The proposed protocol is loaded into IAIK UHF demo tag. The proposed protocol is 
conforming to the Gen 2 standard and is suitable for deployment in a low-cost RFID 
tag. The specifications of the Gen 2 standard that are applied in the proposed 
protocol are listed below:   
 
i. RFID system operating in the 919 MHz - 923 MHz frequency range. 
 
ii. Tag modulates a backscatter signal only after receiving the requisite 
command from a reader. 
 
iii. Tag shall support FM0 modulation with a data rate of 40kb/s for tag to 
reader communication. 
 
iv. Tag shall support Type A Reference Interval (Tari) value of 25 µs 
(26.67 kb/s) for reader to tag communication. 
 
v. Tag memory shall be logically separated into four distinct banks, 
namely, reserved memory, EPC memory, TID memory, and user 
memory.  
 
In addition, counterfeit tags can be detected by employing electronic 
fingerprint matching method. Power response of tag, namely, received and 
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backscatter powers of tag, is used as unique fingerprint information and is stored in 
database to distinguish between legitimate and counterfeit tags.  The efficiency of 
using the power responses of tag to detect counterfeit tags is proved. 
 
1.4 Design Methodology 
 A comprehensive study on low-cost passive UHF RFID system, RFID 
communication air interface standards, RFID tag unique fingerprint, and statistical 
algorithm for tag unique fingerprint matching method was done.  The research was 
carried out in three phases, namely:  
 
i. Design and analysis of lightweight protocol, 
 
ii.  Experimental on reliability of protocol designed, 
 
iii. Identify and match tag unique fingerprint. 
 
In the initial phase, a lightweight cryptographic mutual authentication 
protocol is designed to increase the security and privacy level of a low-cost RFID 
communication system. Gen 2 is selected as a benchmarking RFID air interface 
standards for the communication between RFID reader and tag. The performance and 
functionality of the proposed protocol is illustrated using a JAVA TCP/IP socket 
application. TCP Spy is used to capture the data sent and received between the socket 
communication channels to verify the possibility of man-in-the-middle attacks. 
AVISPA security protocols validation tool is used to analyse the security level and 
robustness of protocol designed.  
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In the second phase, a complete RFID communication system is developed. A 
GUI is developed by using JAVA and the back-end database is created by using 
MySQL. The proposed protocol is loaded into the IAIK UHF Demo tag to test the 
robustness of RFID communication. Experimental measurement is conducted to 
collect experimental results. The data collected is analyzed and evaluated to prove 
the reliability of the proposed protocol. Figure 1.1 shows the flowchart of the overall 
research activities. 
 
In final phase, power response of EPC tags, namely, received and backscatter 
powers of tag, are deployed as unique fingerprint to detect counterfeit tags. The 
power response of each tag is measured and stored in the database for further 
reference. T-test and ANOVA test are used to distinguish between legitimate and 
counterfeit tag efficiently.  The reliability of the statistical tests is tested to match tag 
unique fingerprint efficiently. 
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Design lightweight cryptographic mutual 
authentication protocol 
Illustrate protocol performance using JAVA TCP/
IP socket application
Continue
Start
Identify the probability of non-unequivocally 
identification 
Low probability ?
Analyze the protocol using AVISPA
Safe from attack?
Protocol steps run smoothly?
Determine the data send through transmission 
channel 
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
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Verify the randomness of Ki and Kx using NIST 
test suite
Random?
Design PRNG using LCG, rotation and XOR
No
Yes
Continue
UHF Demo Tag is used and protocol is written 
using ANSI-C
Backend database is created using MySQL and 
GUI is developed using JAVA
Test robustness and reliable of the system
Reliable?
No
Yes
End
Detect power response of tags from suspicious tag
Conduct t-test and ANOVA test 
Measure power response of tags and store in 
database as reference
High accuracy?
Yes
No
 
Figure 1.1: Flowchart of research activities 
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1.5 Thesis Outline 
 The thesis consists of five chapters. Chapter 1 (Introduction) introduces a 
brief background on RFID communication system and development history of RFID 
in Malaysia.  The global and local RFID market analysis and an overview of Gen 2 
standard is presented in this chapter. The problem statements are described to verify 
the direction of the research. The research objectives are stated together with the 
scopes of the project. A brief description of design methodology is elaborated and 
the overall thesis outline is summarized in the last section of the chapter. 
 
Chapter 2 describes the functionality of basic components in an RFID system. 
The detailed Gen 2 standard is elaborated in this chapter. This is followed by the 
description of various type of security threats that facing by the RFID 
communication system. The most recent lightweight and ultralightweight 
cryptographic protocols as well as unique fingerprint of tag that proposed by 
researchers are also presented.  
 
Chapter 3 covers the methodology in designing lightweight cryptographic 
protocol and electronic fingerprint matching method. The basic mathematical 
functions which used in designing the cryptographic protocol are described. In 
addition, AVISPA formal analysis tool used to verify the security of protocol 
designed is elaborated. The subsequent section is the elaboration of complete RFID 
system that consists of UHF Demo tag, TagSense reader, GUI, and database of back-
end server. The functionality of each component is described in this chapter. Next, 
the unique electronic fingerprint method is presented.  
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Chapter 4 shows the implementations, results, and discussion on the analysis 
of the matching indexes used in the protocol.  The design of proposed protocol is 
presented and the analysis of the designed PRNG is conducted. The security analysis 
of proposed protocol is verified from the simulation result of AVISPA formal 
analysis. The possibility to implement proposed protocol is proved by using JAVA 
TCP/IP socket application. The simulation result of TCP Spy is used to identify the 
messages that captured in transmission channels. The performance of 
implementation of proposed protocol in the real RFID communication system is 
analyzed.  
  
Chapter 5 describes the implementation, results, and discussion on the 
reliability of fingerprint matching methods. The detailed experimental procedures in 
conducting measurement of received and backscatter powers of tag are shown. The 
overview of statistical tests including t-test and analysis of variance (ANOVA) test 
are presented.  Besides that, the efficiency tests, namely, false acceptance rate (FAR), 
false rejection rate (FRR), receiver operating characteristic (ROC), area under ROC 
curve (AUC) and error equal rate (EER) are elaborated in this section. The efficiency 
of the t-test and the ANOVA test in distinguish legitimate from counterfeit tags are 
verified.   
 
Chapter 6 concludes the overall research findings that reflect the 
accomplishment of the listed objectives. In addition, some recommendations for 
future research are suggested to improve the performance of the present research. 
The recommendations for future research are provided based on the conclusions 
obtained.  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.0 Introduction 
 RFID technology was first used in military application, called ‘Identify 
Friend or Foe’ during World War II.  In recent decade, RFID technology has 
replaced the barcode system because of its higher reliability, read rate, and read 
range.  The high performance of RFID is a key contributor to the deployment of 
RFID technology in various applications.  Researchers have focused on several 
research topics related to the RFID communication system. The research topics 
includes reliable communication in different environments, securing the 
communication between tags and readers, efficient communication protocols, 
optimization of characteristics, and ensuring location privacy (Henrici, 2008).   
 
 Cryptographic protocols are important in providing a secure communication 
in RFID system.  A RFID protocol has different characteristics, including security, 
complexity, and performance. The characteristics mentioned depend on several 
layers in designing the protocol.  A RFID protocol can be designed using one or a 
number of cryptographic primitives. An algorithm in a certain configuration is 
chosen for each of these primitives.  The algorithm is then can be implemented in 
software to develop various kind of application.  Low-cost RFID tags have low 
complexity because of the computational constraint. The resource scarce 
environment causes the RFID tags susceptible to various security problems.  Hence, 
the RFID protocol should be designed with the lowest impact of vulnerabilities.  The 
protocol should be designed to reach several goals to enhance the security and 
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privacy of an RFID system.  The goals include maintaining data security; preventing 
counterfeiting, illegitimate access, unwanted recognition and tracking, as well as 
coping with DoS attack (Henrici, 2008).  
 
2.1 Basic RFID System 
 RFID is a technology that allows RFID reader to remotely send command to 
read and store information on RFID tag.  An RFID system comprises of three major 
components, namely, RFID reader, tag, and back-end system.  RFID middleware 
application uses multiple scripting languages, including JavaScript, extension 
markup language, and hypertext preprocessor (PHP) (Mitrokotsa et al., 2008).  
 
2.1.1 RFID Reader 
An RFID reader consists of an antenna, a microprocessor, and an interface 
device for forwarding data to the back-end system (Henrici, 2008).  RFID reader 
communicates with tag and back-end system by receiving and sending data in the 
transmission channel.  In addition, RFID reader is able to write data into tag memory, 
authenticates tag as well as powers up passive RFID tag via electromagnetic field.  
RFID readers can be categorized into two categories, namely, stationary reader and 
mobile reader (Kamoun, 2009).  Stationary readers have a fixed location and network 
connection.  In contrast, mobile or handheld readers can be moved around that offer 
more flexible applications.  
 
2.1.2 RFID Tag 
 An RFID tag consists of antenna, microchip and encapsulation. RFID tag can 
be classified based on its functionality, power supply, and operating frequency. 
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i. Functionality 
RFID tags have memory size from a single bit up to several kilobytes. 
Tag memory technologies are categorized into non-volatile and 
volatile storages. The non-volatile storage includes read only, write 
once, read many (WORM), and read/write. The volatile storage is 
used for performing calculation after tag power up. Tag can be 
classified into five broad classes based on the tag computation 
capability (Bailey and Juels, 2006).  
Class 1: Passive read-only tags offer only basic functionality, 
including a fixed EPC identifier, a tag identifier, kill function, and 
optional password-protected access control. 
Class 2: Passive tags offer same functionality as Class 1 but with read-
write memory as well as extended tag identifier, user memory and 
authenticated access control. 
Class 3:Semi-passive tags offer all Class 2 functionality as well as 
possess sensor and on-tag power source. 
Class 4: Active tags offer all Class 3 functionality as well as tag-to-tag 
communications and ad-hoc networking. 
Class 5: Active tags can communicate with all classes of tags. 
 
ii. Power supply 
Passive tag obtains power from the electromagnetic field of reader. 
The tag does not have an internal source of power.  Semi passive tag 
has own power supply for the microchip but communicate by 
obtaining energy from the electromagnetic field of reader.  Active tag 
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uses own source of power (i.e. battery) to support all activities.  Hence, 
active tag has more functionality and able to communicate over a 
longer distance compared to passive tag. However, passive tag 
outperformed active tag in terms of cost, size, and lifetime. This is 
because passive tag offers low-cost, small size and economic lifetime 
due to no internal source of power. 
 
iii. Operating frequency 
The operating frequency of a tag is categorized into four categories to 
enable communication between tag and reader. The electromagnetic 
spectrum consists of low frequency (LF) (125-134 kHz), high 
frequency (HF) (13.56 MHz), UHF (860- 960 MHz), and microwave 
(2.54-5.8 GHz) (Hagl and Aslanidis, 2009). Different frequencies 
have different physical properties. HF tags are designed to carry more 
data and longer read range.  LF tags offer better signal penetration of 
objects and have little absorption through liquid (Zuo, 2010).   
 
2.1.3 Back-end System 
A back-end system is required to process data obtained from tags. A back-end 
system consists of two parts, namely, middleware and applications. Middleware 
plays an important role in back-end system to perform all data grouping and filtering 
tasks (Ghayal et al., 2008). Middleware is used to provide unified interface and 
semantics towards various applications. The middleware should be designed with 
full-features and be able to support different hardware (Lin et al., 2009). The 
middleware acts as a server to connect hardware at one end and support a number of 
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applications at another end. Applications are the software components that act as an 
end user interface of a complete RFID system. Applications are used to interpret the 
data obtained from reader and configure the middleware. 
 
An RFID middleware consists of four layers, namely, reader interface, data 
processor and storage, application interface, and middleware management. 
 
i. Reader interface 
Reader interface is the lowest layer of middleware that used to handle 
interaction with the hardware.  
 
ii. Data processor and storage 
 This layer processes all the raw data obtained from the reader by 
storing, filtering, and grouping the obtained data.  
 
iii. Application interface 
This layer configures the RFID middleware by providing an API for 
the applications. The layer manages the application with the interface 
of middleware. 
 
iv. Middleware management 
This layer manages the configuration of middleware by providing 
information to the processes running in the middleware. 
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2.1.4 Advantages of RFID Technology 
 RFID technology is able to replace the barcode system because RFID 
technology offers better performance and functionality. RFID technology 
outperforms barcode system with the following properties. 
 
i. No line of sight requirement 
ii. Read and write capability of the tag memory 
iii. Higher data capacity 
iv. Higher data rate 
v. Longer reading range 
vi. Multiple tag read capability 
vii. Reusability of the tag 
viii. Resistance to environmental influence 
ix. Durability and reliability 
 
Migration from HF RFID system to UHF RFID system promises a more 
reliable, effective, real time, and scalable data management system. UHF RFID 
readers are able to detect multiple tags simultaneously. UHF technology is less prone 
to distortion error caused by tags overlay each other compared to HF technology. In 
addition, UHF RFID system offers longer read range and faster read rate than 
barcode and HF RFID systems. The higher UHF RFID reader detection rate 
characteristic guarantees an easier scanning process for tracking activities. 
Ubiquitous UHF RFID data management system enables real-time data sharing and 
tracking for heterogeneous applications.  
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2.1.5 RFID Technology in Data Management  
Malaysian libraries implemented barcode system in managing materials in the 
past decade. However, the barcode system has slow read rate and requires line of 
sight detection. On the contrary, RFID technology offers better and efficient 
managing system. In year 2007, Multimedia University (MMU) has implemented HF 
RFID technology to facilitate library search and enable multiple books tracking in 
real time (Rahman, 2007). Smart Shelf is a device that used to pinpoint the exact 
location of books in library. The device communicates in 13.56 MHz and exploits the 
short-range RFID technology. It can automatically identify books within a distance 
of 30 cm relative to the shelf and can detect whether a book is being misplaced, 
missing or rented. The device is deployed to facilitate library search and enable 
multiple books tracking in real time. In year 2009, Penang Public Library has 
become Malaysia’s first library to implement an RFID system compliant to the Gen 2 
standard. The library deploys an automated RFID self-check-in and self-check-out 
station that enables patrons to manage their own transactions, review their account 
status, and renew materials in real time. The system uses RFID tags which has fast 
reading rate and the data is recorded using an RFID inventory management system. 
Hence, accurate and fast inventory on its vast quantity of library assets is guaranteed. 
In addition, the system is equipped with anti-theft UHF reader with a detection range 
of 7 meters that triggers an alarm when it detects tagged books that have not been 
coded as borrowed exiting the library.  
 
Malaysian government has allocated $1,105 million for development of core 
sectors using RFID technology under the Tenth Malaysia Plan (RMK-10) for the 
period of 2011 to 2015. From the allocation, a sum of $232.11 million is provided for 
infrastructure development (Minan, 2007). Hence, strategies for a national RFID 
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roadmap are planned for the next five years. One of the plans is the development of 
Malaysian RFID port that offers less queue time at the gate. This is because 
clearance process would be more efficient due to the container data can be verified 
by officers instantly using hand-held reader. In addition, RFID postal in managing 
mails for government agencies within Putrajaya is deployed. All the mails and street 
posting box are attached with passive RFID tags. The implementation of RFID 
technology can ensure that all the mail items are delivered to correct government 
agencies on time. The location, date and time of delivery can be guaranteed to 
prevent any loss or incorrect delivery of mail items (Mcmc, 2010). 
 
RFID technology has evolved to transform data management system into 
more efficient and reliable system. Many studies are conducted to implement RFID 
system in data managing system, including attendance, libraries, and healthcare 
system. Derakhshan et al. discussed the research problems associated with different 
layers of the suggested system architecture for RFID data management (Derakhshan 
et al., 2007). Three architecture layers were examined to determine the related 
research problems, including layers for data capture, business process, and enterprise 
application. Behera and Kushwaha showed the adoption of RFID technology for 
attendance monitoring (Behera and Kushwaha, 2009). The system was developed to 
detect the presence of tags, acknowledge the presence of the user, and push the data 
to the back-end system. UHF antenna was utilized to make people management 
system completely ubiquitous. The application programming interface (API) was 
designed to become the same core that could be used as a common interface in any 
middleware application. Najera et al. presented the integration of RFID technology 
in two specific healthcare scenarios (Najera et al., 2011). A medical equipment 
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tracking system based on passive UHF RFID for healthcare facilities was analyzed to 
enable both real-time location and theft prevention. A solution for the care and 
control of patients based on passive HF RFID was also illustrated in their paper. A 
backup data source from the wristband of the patient was used to provide an offline 
working mode, aiming to increase application reliability in case of network failure. 
Ching and Tai formulated a set of criteria to evaluate UHF RFID against HF RFID as 
a possible library service transformation tool (Ching and Tai, 2009). Two pilot tests 
were conducted by them to evaluate the two technologies. The results showed that 
UHF RFID outperformed HF RFID in terms of tag reading rate, multiple item 
detection rate, orientation of tag detection, read range, and sensitivity of detection 
gates.  
 
2.2 Gen 2 Standard 
 Gen 2 standard is the second generation RFID air interface protocol 
developed by EPCglobal. This standard defines specifications for a complete 
communication link between RFID reader and tag, including the physical layer, 
collision arbitration algorithm, command and response structure, and data-coding 
methodology (EPCglobal, 2005). The RFID system is operated in the frequency 
range between 860 MHz and 960 MHz. MCMC allocates frequency band between 
919 MHz and 923 MHz for the RFID operating frequency in Malaysia. The standard 
offers faster read and write speed, lower misread tag probability, enhanced security 
and privacy, and anti-collision capability (AlienTechnology, 2005). Gen 2 standard is 
designed to meet a balance between functionality and cost. Hence, the low 
production costs of EPC tags are striking worldwide deployment of UHF RFID 
technology.  
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2.2.1 Physical Layer 
 The communication link between reader and tags is half-duplex. A reader 
receives information from tags by transmitting an unmodulated radio frequency (RF) 
carrier and listening for a backscattered reply. A reader modulates an RF carrier 
using double-sideband amplitude shift keying, single-sideband amplitude shift 
keying, or phase-reversal amplitude shift keying. All the modulations use a pulse-
interval encoding (PIE) format as shown in Figure 2.1.  Based on the PIE symbols, 
Tari is the reference time interval for reader to tag signalling. Tari is also the duration 
of a data-0. The high value indicates carrier wave and the low value indicates 
attenuated carrier wave. Tari values in the range of 6.25 µs and 25 µs shall be used 
for the duration of an inventory round. PIE encoding is used in reader to tag 
communications because it is able to provide ample radio frequency energy to power 
up tags. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: PIE symbols (EPCglobal, 2005) 
 
The tags receive the operating energy from the same modulated RF carrier.  
The tags communicate information by backscatter modulating the amplitude or phase 
of the RF carrier.  The tags shall encode the backscattered data as either FM0 or 
Miller-modulated subcarrier (MMS) in response to reader commands. 
